The purpose of this paper is to measure intangible assets, to construct the capital stock of intangible assets, and to examine the contribution of intangible capital to economic growth in Japan. We follow the approach of Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006) to measure intangible investment using the 2006 version of the Japan Industry Productivity Database. We find that the ratio of intangible investment to GDP in Japan has risen during the past 20 years and now stands at 7.5%. However, the ratios of intangible investment to GDP and of intangible to tangible investment in Japan are smaller than the values estimated for the US by Corrado et al. (2006). In addition, we find that the growth rate for intangible capital in Japan declined from 1980s to the 1990s, which is in stark contrast with the high growth rate for intangible capital in the US in the late 1990s. Therefore, the contribution of intangible capital to total labor productivity growth in Japan is substantially smaller than in the US.
Introduction
In the 1990s, the United States enjoyed rapid rates of productivity growth. A major contributing factor was the revolution in information and communication technology (ICT) . The resurgence of US productivity growth led governments of other developed countries such as the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Japan to promote ICT investment in order to catch up with US productivity levels. In Japan, ICT investment has shown steady growth, increasing at an annual average rate of 4.2% from 1990 to 2002 and reaching 27 trillion yen in 2002, which is equivalent to 25% of total investment. As a result of this heavy investment in ICT, the ICT capital stock stood at 128 trillion yen (approximately 1 trillion euro) in 2002, accounting for about 10% of the total capital stock. Yet, the rapid increase in ICT investment in Japan so far has failed to close the productivity gap with the US.
Examining the reasons for the productivity gap, we find that a major factor is the low productivity growth in services that use ICT, such as banking and insurance, retail, etc., as shown in Table 1 . The table also indicates that in the case of the EU countries, too, the productivity gap vis-à-vis the US is due to the low productivity growth in ICT-using services.
(Insert Table 1) Examining the slow productivity growth in EU countries, van Ark (2004) suggested that the difference with the US might be explained by differences in the accumulation of intangible assets which play a complementary role to ICT capital. Studies that have addressed the role of intangible assets include those by McGrattan and Prescott (2005) , who took intangible investment at the macro level into account in order to explain the solid growth of the US economy during the 1990s, and Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006) , who measured intangible investment in the US and showed the significant contribution of intangible capital to US productivity growth.
The aim of this paper is to measure intangible investment and to examine its contribution to economic growth in Japan. We have two reasons for focusing on the measurement of intangible investment. The first is that we want to check whether trends in intangible investment can explain the productivity gap between the US and Japan in the 1990s. The second is that to date no studies have been carried out on intangible capital in Japan. Even more than its predecessors, the new government under Prime Minister Abe has made the achievement of higher economic growth the cornerstone of its economic policy, and given the economic challenges facing Japan, it is crucial to understand why productivity growth has lagged behind that in the US.
The role of intangible capital potentially is one key factor and understanding if and why this is the case may make an important contribution to policy design.
Our paper consists of four sections. In the next section, we estimate tentative time series of intangible investment following the methodology developed by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006) . We find that the ratio of intangible to tangible assets is lower in Japan than in the US. In Section 3, we construct intangible capital by using the intangible investment series and conduct a growth accounting exercise. The results of the growth accounting with intangible capital show that the contribution of intangible capital to economic growth is small because the share of intangible capital in total capital is also relatively small. However, this result does not mean that the potential role of intangible capital is not important for economic growth. If intangible capital in Japan contributed to economic growth at the same rate as in the US, labor productivity growth in Japan would be 0.2 percentage points higher. The last section summarizes our results and their policy implications and discusses future tasks.
Measurement of intangible investment
In this section, we describe how we measure intangible investment in Japan and look at the major trends in intangible investment. In order to measure intangible investment, we follow the approach of Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2006 ) (abbreviated as CHS hereafter), who classify intangibles into three major types of assets: computerized information, innovative property, and economic competencies.
Computerized information consists of, for example, software and databases. Innovative property includes scientific and nonscientific R&D, where the latter refers to, for example, mineral exploitation, copyright and license costs, and other product development, design, and research expenses. Economic competencies, finally, include brand equity, firm-specific human capital, and organizational structure.
Computerized information
We take data on investment in computerized information from the 2006 version of the Japan Industry 
Innovative property
As for the investment in science and engineering R&D, we take the expenses on materials and labor costs on R&D activities from the Survey on R&D Expenses conducted by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. We estimate the investment in mineral exploration by using data from the Handbook of the Mining Industry and the Annual Report on Natural Gas. The estimation of copyright and license costs relies on data from the JIP 2006 Database. To estimate these costs, we use the nominal output data of JIP industry no. 92 (publishing and newspaper industry) and JIP industry no. 93 (video picture, sound information, character information production and distribution industry).
As for the estimation of other product development, design, and research expenses, CHS (2005) summed the following three items: (1) new product development costs in financial services and other service industries such as book publishing, motion picture production, sound recording production, and broadcasting (such costs account for 20% of intermediate purchases in these industries); (2) new architectural and engineering designs which roughly account for half of industry purchased services (CHS (2005) estimated this value from the revenues of architectural and engineering design industries reported in the Census Bureau's Services Annual Survey) (3) R&D in social sciences and humanities which is estimated as twice industry purchased services to include own-account expenses on R&D in social sciences and humanities (this item is also estimated from the revenues the Census Bureau's Services Annual Survey). Because reliable data for the estimation of (2) and (3) are unavailable, we only estimate (1) using data for JIP industries no. 69 (finance industry) and no. 70 (insurance industry).
Economic Competencies
As for the investment in brand equity, we follow the approach by CHS (2006), taking 60% of the nominal output purchased by other industries in advertising industry (JIP industry no. 85).
Following CHS (2005), we assume that investment in firm specific human capital consists of two types of expenses: (1) direct firm expenses, and (2) 
Measurement results for intangible investment in Japan
Our measurement results are shown in Table 2 . Our estimates of intangible investment suggest that the share of intangible investment in GDP in Japan is 7.5% on average from 1995-2002 which is smaller than the estimates for the US by CHS (2006) and the UK by Marrano and Haskel (2006) . However, it should be noted that our measurement of intangible investment in Japan is likely to be an underestimation due to the lack of reliable data for the estimation of investment in other product development, design, and research, firm-specific human capital, and organizational structure.
(Insert Table 2) Moreover, comparing the relative levels of intangible and tangible investment in Japan and the United States, other significant differences emerge. For example, CHS (2006) found that in the United States, intangible investment was 1.2 times the level of tangible investment. However, according to our estimation, the ratio of intangible to tangible investment in Japan was only 0.3.
Given that the share of intangible investment in GDP in Japan is not far behind that in the US, the low ratio of intangible to tangible investment in Japan indicates not that investment in intangibles is small, but that investment in tangibles is exceptionally large. We suspect that the difference in investment behavior between Japan and the United States is at least partially caused by differences in the financial system. In Japan, financial institutions such as banks play a major role in the provision of corporate funds and they typically require tangible assets as collateral to provide financing. As a result, Japanese firms have preferred to accumulate tangible assets which can be used as collateral. In addition, small firms have been hampered in their growth because they often possess insufficient tangible assets to increase borrowing. These mechanisms as a result of Japan's financial system are likely to be important reasons why the ratio of intangible to tangible investment is low in Japan.
The trend in the estimated total investment in intangible assets as well as the three components is depicted in Figure 1 . As can be seen, investment in intangible assets increased until 1998, but then registered a slowdown around the turn of the millennium and actually declined in 2002, when it stood at around 40 trillion yen. The largest component of intangible investment in Japan is innovative property with a share of nearly 45% in the early 2000s, although this represents a decrease from the past (Table 3) . Conversely, the share of computerized information has increased during the past 20 years, and it is this item that is responsible for the increase in the ratio of total intangible investment to GDP. In contrast, the GDP ratios of the other intangible investment components remained stable (Table 4) . While the investment/GDP ratio for computerized information is larger than those estimated for the US and the UK, the small GDP ratios of innovative property and economic competencies are in clear contrast with the US and the UK cases.
(Insert Figure 1, Tables 3 and 4) 
Growth accounting
Using the intangible investment data obtained in the previous section, we examine the contribution of intangible capital to Japan's economic growth. We obtain real investment series by using the deflators shown in Table 5 . We then use the perpetual inventory method to construct the capital stock of intangible assets.
The depreciation rates for intangible assets are taken from CHS (2006) and are shown in Table 6 . Since data on intangible investment at 1995 prices are available from 1973, we can use 1980 as the starting point for the construction of the capital stock of intangible assets.
(Insert Tables 5 and 6) The value and growth rate of Japan's intangible capital stock are reported in Table 7 (Insert Table 7) In order to examine the contribution of intangible capital to Japan's economic growth, we conduct a growth accounting exercise. We assume the following Cobb-Douglas type production function: The results of our growth accounting exercise based on equation (2) are shown in Table 8 accumulation to labor productivity did not change from the 1980s to the 1990s is that the slowdown in the growth rate of intangible capital in the 1990s was offset by the increase in the share of intangible capital in total capital. We find that the capital deepening effect was larger in the growth accounting with intangible capital than in the conventional growth accounting. Conversely, TFP growth is slightly smaller in the growth accounting with intangible capital than in the conventional growth accounting without intangible assets.
Thus, the TFP growth rate in the growth accounting with intangible investment became negative in 2000-02, but was positive in the growth accounting without intangible investment.
(Insert Table 8) The share of the contribution of intangible capital to labor productivity growth in the 1990s was 23%, which is less than the share estimated by CHS for the United States. CHS found that the increase in intangible capital in the late 1990s was responsible for about 30% of labor productivity growth in the US. If the contribution of intangible capital to labor productivity growth were as large in Japan as in the United 1 In the case of capital input, we took quality into account.
States, then Japanese labor productivity growth in the 1990s would have been 0.2 percentage points higher than it actually was.
Policy implications and future research agenda
The purpose of this paper was to measure intangible assets in Japan. Using our estimate, we constructed the capital stock of intangible assets and examined the contribution of intangible capital to Japanese economic growth. The results of our study can be summarized as follows.
First, investment in intangible assets in Japan has grown rapidly. Consequently, the ratio of intangible investment to GDP has also risen during the past 20 years. However, the ratio of intangible investment to GDP in Japan is less than the value estimated for the US by CHS. In addition, the ratio of intangible to tangible investment in Japan is lower than that in the US. One possible reason for this are differences in the financial system, in particular the fact that much corporate financing in Japan relies on loans from banks which require tangible assets as collateral.
Second, the growth rate in intangible capital in Japan declined from the 1980s to the 1990s. This slowdown stands in stark contrast with the high growth rate in intangible capital in the US in the late 1990s.
Third, despite the slowdown in the growth of intangible capital, the contribution of intangible capital to economic growth in Japan remained more or less unchanged during the 1980s and 1990s. The reason for this is that the slowdown in intangible capital accumulation was offset by an increase in the share of intangible capital in total capital. However, the contribution of intangible capital to total labor productivity growth in Japan has been much smaller than in the US.
Our results have a direct bearing on the debate on how to overcome the low productivity growth in the service sector that has slowed down aggregate productivity growth in Japan. Service sector activities tend to be more intangible asset-intensive than manufacturing activities and until now, it has been the tangible assetintensive manufacturing sector which has driven Japan's economic growth. However, Japan is facing strong competition in the manufacturing sector from emerging Asian economies such as China, India, and South Korea, and Japan cannot rely on the manufacturing sector alone to generate economic growth in the future. It therefore has to promote growth in the service sector in order to attain GDP growth rates of 2% or 3%. In order to achieve such change in economic structure, reforms to the accounting system and the financial system are necessary. As mentioned in Section 2, firms in the service sector which hold few tangible assets are stunted in their growth opportunities because they face difficulties in obtaining external finance.
Introducing a new accounting system which also values intangible assets would open the way for banking
and insurance firms to recognize intangible assets as collateral for finance. Therefore, it would be helpful to devise a methodology that aids the valuation of the intangible assets of such firms. In addition, efforts should be made to transform the current system in which banks dominate corporate financing to a new financial system in which even small firms can gain access to funds through capital markets.
Our study is in progress and much remains to be done. For example, the measurement of firm-specific human capital and organizational structure is likely to be underestimated due to the lack of reliable data. To do so, we will need to gather data concerning firm-specific human capital and organizational change by examining firm-level activities. 2 In addition, we hope to construct intangible investment data by industry to examine the effects of intangible capital on productivity growth in the service sector.
We hope that once we have completed these tasks, we will have a clearer understanding of the role of intangible assets in promoting Japan's economic growth through faster productivity growth in the service sector. Labor productivity growth . Firm-specific human capital 1,600 We take the data of educational and vocational training cost per worker from the General Survey on Wages and Working Hours System published by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. We calculate the total costs of firm-specific human capital by multiplying the cost by workers.
28.5
Organizational structure
6,525 Data sources: Survey on Financial Statements of Business Enterprises published by the Ministry of
Finance. We take the data on salaries and bonuses for executives from the survey and treat 20% of these payments as investment in organizational structure. 
